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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
ANENT THE STATUTE OF WESTMINSTER I AND
LIABILITY
BY ERWIN F. MEYFR
The recent experience of the United States with the Eighteenth
Amendment and the Volstead Act has dramatized a problem of
law that has always been present but one that increases in its
importance and intensity with the development of that indefin-
able but nevertheless positive force called public opinion. That
problem is the nature of law. Sir Paul Vinagradoff in com-
menting on this question wrote that law is "a set of rules direct-
ing the relations and conduct of their state's members." 1 H. J.
Laski writing on the subject added that "Laws as such we dis-
cern to be morally neutral; they are merely decisions which get
accepted in the presence of social forces." 2 In short, the funda-
mental question involved is whether statutory enactments are a
cause or a resultant of social control; whether they express a
condition or a desire. Perhaps the answer is that there exists
a twilight zone in juridical development in which both forces,
cause and result, are at play. Such a conclusion should not,
however, blind us to the necessity that all statutory provisions
must conform to Laski's definition of acceptance. It is neces-
sary to realize this essential character of enactments to approach
the famous Statute of Westminster I and its effect on the "law"
or "custom" of medieval liability.
The latest treatise on medieval English law has closely fol-
lowed the usual opinion that the famous statute of Westminster I
passed in 1275 legislated vicarious liability out of the picture.8
A reading of the statute fathers such a conclusion.
It is provided also, that in no city, Borough, town, market
or fair, there be no Foreign person (a stranger to the city)
which is of this realm distrained from any debt whereof he
is not the Debtor or Pledge, and whosoever doth it, shall be
1 HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE (Oxford University Press, London, 1920)
I, 52.
2 GRAw imAR OF PoLITIcs (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1925) 275.
a Sanborn, F. R., ORIGINS OF THE EARLY ENGLISH MARITIME AND COD1-
mRCIAIL LAW (Century Co., New York, 1930) 354; cf. Isaacs, Nathan,
Fault and Liability, SELECT ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TORT, 254; Meyer, Er-
win F., English Craft Gilds and Borough Governments of the Later Middle
Ages, UNxrRSrTy OF COLORADO STUDIES, XVII, 414-415, February, 1930.
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grievously punished and without delay, the distress shall be
delivered by the bailiffs of the place or by the King's Bail-
iffs if need be.4
The statute did not consider alien or foreign merchants.
They had to wait until 135i, 1353 for a similar protection.5
Professor Sanborn's comment on the great Westminster enact-
ment illustrates a failure to grasp the fact that Westminster I
may well have been a pronouncement of the law as it ought to
have been rather than the law as it was. It was the expression
of an ideal, rather than a statement of a universally accepted
fact. The statute, to use a modern phrase, was a late thirteenth
century "noble experiment." The author, Professor Sanborn,
however, looked upon it in his book as a "recognition of a situa-
tion already existing to a considerable extent." 6 The extent to
which it was accepted can be debated. To be sure some boroughs
had received royal charters that abolished the system of re-
prisals by 1275. 7 But that is only one half of the story.
It might be well to state briefly what the system of reprisals
or withernam was in the late Middle Ages as it existed in Eng-
land. Pollock and Maitland have given the classic summary of
the general principle of liability involved.
If a merchant of X owes a trading debt to a merchant of Y,
then if other merchants of.X go to the town of Y or to some
fair where the creditor finds them, they will like enough be
held for the debt-at all events if he proves that he had
made a fruitless effort to obtain justice in the court of X-
they are in communares of the principal debtor, they are
"his peers and parceners," they are in the "scot and lot"
with him, and they and each of them, must answer for the
trading debts, for debts, that is, incurred in the exercise of
trading privileges which they all enjoy in common.8
To illustrate the principle no better case can be cited than that
of Roger Blacymouth of Cambridge. In 1270 he was quit of all
liability when arrested in the Fair of St. Ives because he proved
4 Statutes at Large, I, 52.
5 27 Edward III, c. xvii, ibid., I, 351.
6 Sanborn, op. cit. 354; cf. Norton, George, COMMENTARIES ON THE HIS-
TORY, CONSTITUTION, CHARTERED FRANCHISES OF THE CITY OF LONDON,
(Longmans, Green & Company, London, 1869) 329-330.
7 Bateson, Mary, Borough Customs, II, liv. SELDEN SOcIETY PUBLICA-
TIONS, XXI.
8HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, I, 683.
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that he was not "in scot and lot with the community of Cam-
bridge or a member thereof. . . ." 9
To guard against such vicarious liability certain boroughs ob-
tained charters from the crown exempting them in part or
whole from its effect. But on the other hand there were specific
grants made that enabled boroughs to institute this process of
vicarious liability known as withernam.10 The evidence at hand
proves that the system of reprisals or withernam was the ac-
cepted method of action for the recovery of damages. With this
brief statement of what withernam was and what it was that
the statute of Westminster I attempted to legislate out of ex-
istence in 1275 let us see what that state of affairs was after
1275, that is after the passage of the royal statute that "was
only a recognition of a situation already existing to a consider-
able extent."' 11
On July 7, 1301, some twenty-six years after the enactment
of Westminster I, Alexander de Scaylesworth of Northampton
"was attached by 10 casks of wine because the Bailiffs of North-
ampton had arrested the goods and chattels of value 20s. of
Richard Poterel, junior, of London, as a forfeit, which goods
Richard had bought in Northampton market. The defendant
found pledges . . . to restore Richard's goods within eight days
and to satisfy the City for the contempt and trespass." 12 It
should be noted that the goods seized belonged to an innocent
person but a resident of Northampton and hence one that served
the purpose.
An even more pointed case that denied the acceptance of the
principle of Westminster I is that of London v. Dunwich in
1319.13 A writ was sent by the crown to the mayor and bailiffs
of Dunwich reminding them that London had addressed letters
to them requesting that justice be done to two Londoners and
inasmuch as Dunwich had failed to do justice the crown wished
to remind them that "according to the custom of the city (of
9 Gross, C., editor, Select Cases on the Law Merchant, 3, SELDEN SOcmTY
PUBLICATIONS, XXIII.
10 Bateson, M., op. cit., II, liv. iv. For an example of such grants see Ap-
pendix A; of. CALENDAR OF PATENT ROLLS, 1327-1330, 29.
11 Saniborn, op. cit. 354.
12 Thomas, A. H., editor, CALENDAR OF EARLY MAYOR'S COURT ROLLS OF THE
CITY OF LONDON, 1298-1307, 115.1 Sharpe, R. R., editor, CALENDAR OF LETTER BooKs OF THE CITY OF LON-
DON, E, 32-33; cf. ibid. E, 42, 178.
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London) in matters of this kind, the mayor and commonalty (of
London) could take withernam of the goods of such peers and
commoners (parium et communariorum) as were found in the
city." If 1275 was the date that marked the death of vicarious
liability, its ghost was still haunting the chancery of the realm
and the local courts. Perhaps another type of action will give
additional proof of the vitality or reality of the ghostly principle
of withernam for Englishmen after 1275.
On August 26, 1327, fifty-two years after Westminster I, the
London officialdom was in receipt of communications from the
officers of Rye and Winchelsea relating to toll charges that had
been "illegally exacted from the merchandise of Adam Lucas."
Rye assured London that justice would be done Adam if he
would but sue those who had "tolled" him in their borough. A
similar answer came from Winchelsea. The Londoners, how-
ever, were not satisfied.
Let the entry tell the story:
The above answers not being deemed satisfactory the
mayor, aldermen and commonalty unanimously agreed that
Wither m should be taken from the men of Winchelsea
and Rye, and their goods, as occasion served. . . .Note
that thirteen casks and two pipes of red wine and one cask
of white wine, belonging to Richard Selern of Winchelsea
were seized as withernam. As he did not sue for their re-
turn, they were valued as 123 6s. 8d. and delivered to the
above Adam Lucas upon his giving security to answer
thereof quo et quando.14
If the above examples do not serve to qualify Professor San-
born's statement that withernam was non-existent "to a con-
siderable extent" by 1275, then one last example. In 1327 Ed-
ward III granted the mayor, bailiffs and men of Bishop's Lynn
a charter that "for five years no one whether foreigner or towns-
man in the same town or part thereof be mollested, or his good
and merchandise arrested, for any debt whereof he is not the
principal debtor or surety or for any trespass by any other per-
son whatsoever, unless the said debt or trespass be known to
concern the king especially." 15
14 Thomas, A. H., editor, CALENDAR OF PLEA AND MEMORANDA ROLLS OF
THE CrrY OF LONDON, 1323-1364, 26; cf. ibid. 90, 180-181.
15 CALENDAIk OF PATENT ROLLS, 1327-1330, 29. The grant when finally
made was made for two years. Ibid. 1327-1330, 30.
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Of course, one could argue that this patent anticipated that
statute of 27 Edward III and its purpose was to extend the pro-
tection of Westminster I to all persons. But the opposite con-
clusion is also valid, i. e., that the burgesses of Bishop's Lynn
had not had the benefits of Westminster I. In the light of the
examples given such a conclusion seems sound.
The examples of evident repudiation of the principle of limited
liability may not be many in numbers as far as records go, still
their character is such as to warrant the conclusion that 1275
cannot be assigned as the date for the disappearance vf either
the principle or practice of vicarious liability. To say that Lon-
don was an exception demands proof particularly in view of the
wording of the Statute and also in view of the case of the burgers
of Bishop's Lynn. Perhaps the problem resolves itself again
into that suggested by Laski's definition as to the nature of law.
Because of the examples cited that flatly denied the acceptance
of the principle of Westminster I, it would appear that the
statute at the time of its enactment was in the nature of a thir-
teenth century noble experiment which in the course of the next
century and a half became accepted as a condition, but certainly
such an accepted condition did not exist when Westminster I
was enacted in 1275.
APPENDIX
Charter Provisions concerning Withercm granted to London'(
HENRY I HENRY II
Et onnes debitores qui civibus debita Et de onmibut debitis suisque ac-
Hlebent eis reddant vel in London' se commodata fuerint apud London' et
disrationent quod non debent. de vadimoniis ibedem factis placita
Quod si reddere noluerint neque ad (sint) apud London'.
disrationandum venire, tune cives
quibus debita sua debent, qapiant
intra civitatem namia sua, vel de
commanitate (?) in qua nianet qui
debitum debet.
Et si quis thelonium vel consuetu-
dinem a civibus London' ceperit, Et si quis in tota Anglia thelon-um
cives London' capiant de burgo vel et consuetudinem ab hoiminibus Lon-
de villa ubi thelonium vel consuetudo don' ceperit, postquam ipso a recto
capta fuit, quantum homo London' defecerit, vicomes London' namium
pro thelonio dedet et proinde damno inde apud London' capiat.
ceperit.
16 Bateson, op. cit. II, iv; cf. ibid.
of like character.
I, 119-125 for other charter provision
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